DATE TRANSMITTAL SLIP 7 Apr 83 TO: Paul Berenson, Def. Science Board ROOM NO. BUILDING 3E1074 <u>Pentagon</u> REMARKS: Attached is another document I would like for SPC to read. Please return it to me when he has finished with it. Also note that it is not to be reproduced or distributed to anyone. Thanks. FROM: Harry Rowen, Chairman/NIC ROOM NO. BUILDING EXTENSION 7E62 Hqs./CIA FORM NO. 241 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: C/NIC

Attached is the draft chapter on the Soviet perspective of the balance in Europe that was deleted by NFIB.

This was a rudimentary, first attempt at such an approach. The state of the art, has advanced since then. This is our only copy, so 1'd appreciate having it back when you're finished with it.

5 Apr 83

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

NFAC 3613-81 12 June 1981

National Intelligence Officers

MEMORANDUM FOR	Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA	Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment Chairman, National Intelligence Council RL
FROM	Major General Ennis C. Whitehead, Jr., USA National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces
SUBJECT	Use of US-Soviet Comparisons in National Intelligence
REFERENCE	: O/DCI Memo dtd. 8 Jun 81, "Discussion of Net Assessments and Provision of U.S. Force Data to the CIA"
displaying onl mates (Referen of Forces in C	iance with the agreement between the DCI and SECDEF on y Soviet forces information in national intelligence estice) requires that we delete or alter Chapter VI, "Comparison entral Europe: A Soviet Perspective," of NIE 11-14-81 Possible alternatives are described in paragraph 5.
2. <u>Backg</u> of the balance	round. The aim of Chapter VI is to provide a Soviet perception of forces in Central Europe. The analysis incorporates:
th	e Soviet method for making force comparisons;
	viet judgments on relative weapon values (Tab l ows tank scores);
da	ta on Warsaw Pact forces;
	ta on NATO forces (Tab 2 shows example of TO weapons procurement data).
3. Additionally, to permit comparisons of Soviet and US perceptions we have provided the reader with the results of several US analyses. For example, Tab 3 shows the Soviet view of relative force effectiveness during mobilization; Tab 4 shows a similar US calculation.	

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SUBJECT: Use of US-Soviet Comparisons in National Intelligence Estimates 4. In summary, limited amounts of highly aggregated US data are displayed in Chapter VI, but, more importantly, much US data has been used behind the scenes to construct the Soviet perception as displayed by the graphs (Tab 3). Our key assumption is that the Soviets have a full and accurate knowledge of NATO force availability, modernization rates, and reinforcement capability. 5. Alternatives. There are several options for resolving the issue of force comparisons and the use of US data in the NIE. a. Delete Chapter VI. This solution would comply fully with the DCI-SECDEF agreement and satisfy LTG Tighe's desire to avoid US-Soviet force comparisons in all estimates. b. Retain a modified Chapter VI, but delete specific US (NATO) data (see Tab 2) and all examples of US analysis (Tab 4). Thus, we would continue to provide an intelligence community estimate of Soviet perceptions without showing specific US data. c. Retain Chapter VI as written. This alternative would provide a more complete analysis, but would show highly aggregated data on NATO forces. (C) 6. I informally polled the NFIB representatives about retaining this chapter: Army wants it; Air Force, Navy, State, and NSA appear to favor keeping it or don't care one way or the other. NFAC and the Marines withheld judgment; DIA opposes it. Most agreed that we should take out all references to comparable US analyses. 7. Recommendation. Propose that we retain a modified Chapter VI in the NIE (Alternative 5.b). Ennis C. Whitehead, Jr. 19 JUN 81 MFR: Adm INNIAN APPROUSE

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